top of page

From preview to pre-feel

When we mentally simulate future events, we do not only preview them, but also pre-feel them – we predict the event’s hedonic consequences (the pleasures and pains it should produce). Since the future does not exist and we therefore do not have future hedonic reference points, we have no choice but to use our present hedonic state of mind (mental model) as a basis for pre-feeling the future. This means our present hedonic state and contextual factors (experiences, thoughts, bodily states) influence our simulations of the future and render them unrepresentative and decontextualised.


Unrepresentative

Since memories are the building blocks of simulations, simulations cannot be accurate if memories are inaccurate representations of the past. We typically remember either the worst or best experiences of events rather than the typical experience. We also tend to remember the closing moments of an experience rather than the most typical moments. Unusual and recent events are more memorable, and we tend to use them more often when simulating future events. The result is simulations based on defining moments rather than the weighted average of the bulk of essential and inessential features.


Decontextualised

Simulations tend to be decontextualised since contextual changes are not fully accounted for in perceived future events. Contextual factors (heart rate, relationships, weather, traffic) change constantly and influence our present hedonic state which influences our simulation of the future. When we are scared the future is a threat, but when we are happy the future is opportunity and we tend to simulate accordingly. Contextual factors can also influence our direct experience of an event in relation to its simulated outcome. A planned sunny weekend away might turn out to be dreary days in the rain because we have neglected to check the weather forecast. In this case our simulation was decontextualised and therefore inaccurate.


Future alternatives

The subjective nature of simulations can be mitigated by purposefully thinking about a range of outcomes instead of only the most desirable. Broadening the future in terms of alternatives makes for more realistic future visions and outcomes and less daydreaming. Our simulations become more contextualised and representative of reality. For most people thinking about the future typically produces three alternative narratives or scenarios: best case, worst case and business as usual.


Best case: this scenario is the preferable future. It is the destination of choice had we unlimited options. It is what we want to exchange for the unwanted present.


Worst case: this is the future that would be worse than the unwanted present. It has the potential to scare us into action or inaction, depending on its plausibility.


Business as usual: this is the foreseeable (or current) future with the potential of deteriorating if we do not take action. It can be described as the continuation of our unwanted present circumstances.


However, some of us go beyond the conventional and ask: ‘what if?’ What if there is an outlier future possibility that is not even in our frame of reference? What are the potential wild cards that could be coming our way?


Wild card: this future can be described as perceived low probability, high impact events which are global in nature. Examples include the Chernobyl disaster, 2008 Global Financial Crisis, September 11 terrorist attacks and the Covid-19 pandemic.


What if?

Asking what if? questions broaden the scope and reliability of future simulations which have an impact on the way we perceive the world and think about the future. These questions do not have to be confined to potential global events, but can include low probability local events and unforeseen changes to organisational or personal circumstances.


[i] Gilbert, D.T. & Wilson, T.D. 2007. Prospection: experiencing the future. Science. Vol. 317(5843): 1351-1354. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144161

[ii] Schwartz, Peter. 1996. The Art of the Long View. New York. Doubleday.


 
 
 

Comments


bottom of page